#76,3 


Duke  University  Libraries 

Message  of  the 
Conf  Pam  12mo  #763 


MESSAGE  OF    THE  PRESIDENT. 


Executive  Department, 

March  11,  1862. 
To  the  Speaker  of  the 

Ihmse  of  Representatives : 

I  transmit,  herewith,  copies  of  such  official  reports  as 
have  been  received  at  the  War  Department,  of  the  defence 
and  fall  of  Fort  Donelson.  They  will  be  found  incomplete 
and  unsatisfactory.  Instructions  have  been  given  to  fur- 
nish further  information  upon  the  several  points  not  made 
intelligible  by  the  reports.  It  is  not  stated  that  reinforce- 
ments were  at  any  time  asked  for;  nor  is  it  demonstrated  to 
have  been  impossible  to  have  saved  the  army  by  evacuating 
the  position  ;  nor  is  it  known  by  what  means  it  was  found 
practicable  to  withdraw  a  part  of  the  garrison,  leaving  the 
remainder  to  surrender;  nor  upon  what  authority  or  prin- 
ciple of  action  the  senior  Generals  abandoned  responsibility, 
by  transferring  the  command  to  a  junior  officer. 

In  a  former  communication  to  Congress,  I  presented  the 
propriety  of  a  suspension  of  judgment  in  relation  to  the 
disaster  at  Fort  Donelson,  until  official  reports  could  be  re- 
ceived. I  regret  that  the  information  now  furnished  is  so 
defective.  In  the  meantime,  hopeful  that  satisfactory  ex- 
planation may  be  made.  I  have  directed,  upon  the  exhibi- 
tion of  the  case  as  presented  by  the  two  senior  General-, 
that  they  should  be  relieved  from  command  to  await  further 
orders  whenever  a  reliable  judgment  can  be  rendered  on  the 
merits  of  the  case.  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 


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LETTER  FROM  SECRETARY  OF  AVAR. 


Confederate  State*  of  America,  War  Dep't,  ) 
Richmond,  March  11th,  1862.  $ 
Sir:  I  have  the  honor  to  enclose,  herewith,  the  re- 
ports made  by  Brigadier-General  Floyd  and  Brigadier- 
General  Pillow  of  the  surrender  of  Fort  Donelson.  No 
statement  is  made  by  either  General  of  the  mode  of  his  own 
escape,  nor  can  the  exact  circumstances  which  accompanied 
the  surrender  he  officially  known  till  Brigadier-General 
Buckner,  now  a  prisoner,  is  enabled  to  make  bis  report. 

I  suhmit  the  whole  for  transmission   to  Congress,  or  such 
other  action  as  you  may  deem  proper, 
I  am,  your  obedient  servant. 

J.  P.  P.ENJAMIN, 
Q  Secretary  of  War. 

To  the  President. 


REPORT   OF   Gil).   J.    PILLOW, 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  OF  THE  C.  S.  A. 


Columiu  \,  Tennessee, 
February  18th,  1S62. 
Captain  Clarence  Derrick, 

Assist<n)t  Adjutant  Gaicral  .' 
On  the  9th  instant  General  A  S.  Johnston  ordered  me 
to  proceed  to  Fort  Donelson  and  take  command  at  that  post. 
On  the  10th  instant  I  arrived  at  that  place.  In  detailing 
the  operations  of  the  forces  under  my  command  at  Fort 
Donelson,  it  is  proper  to  state  the  condition  of  that  -work, 
and  of  the  forces  constituting  its  garrison.  When  I  ar- 
rived 1  found  the  work  on  the  river  battery  unfinished,  and 
wholly  too  weak  to  resist  the  force  of  heavy  artillery.  I 
found  a  ten-inch  colnmhiad  and  thirty-two  pounder  rifled 
gun  had  not  been  mounted.  Deep  gloom  was  hanging  over 
the  command,  ami  the  troops  greatly  depressed  and  demoral- 
ized by  the  circumstances  attending  the  surrender  of  Fort 
Henry,  and  the  manner  of  retiring  from  that  place. 

My  first  attention  was  given  to  the  necessity  of  strength- 
ening this  work  and  mounting  the  two  heavy  guns,  and  to 
the  construction  of  defensive  works  to  protect  the  rear  of 
the  river  battery.  I  imparted  to  the  work  all  the  energy 
which  it  was  possible  to  do,  working  day  and  night  with 
the  whole  command. 

The  battery  was  without  a  competent  number  of  artil- 
lerists, and  those  that  were  there  were  not  well  instructed 
in  the  use  of  their  guns.  To  provide  for  this  want,  I  placed 
the  artillery  companies  under  active  course  of  instruction 
in  the  use  of  their  guns.  I  detailed  Captain  Ross,  with  his 
company  of  light  artillerists,  to  the  command  of  one  of  the 
river  batteries.  These  heavy  guns  being  mounted  and  pro- 
vision being  made  for  working  them,  and  a  proper  supply 
of  ammunition  having  heen  procured  by  my  orders  from 
Nashville,  1  felt  myself  prepared  to  test  the  effect  of  the 


fire  of  heavy  metal  against  the  enemy's  gunboats,  though 
the  work  stood  much  in  need  of  more  heavy  pieces.  The 
armament  of  the  batteries  consisted  of  eight  thirty-two  (32) 
pounders,  three  thirty-two  (32)  pound  cannonades,  one 
eight  (8)  columbiad,  and  one  rifle  thirty-two  (32)  calibre. 

The  selection  of  the  site  for  the  work  was  an  unfortunate 
one.  While  its  command  of  the  river  was  favorable,  the 
site  was  commanded  by  the  heights  above  and  below  on  the 
river,  and  by  a  continuous  range  of  hills  all  around  the 
works  to  its  rear. 

A  field  work  of  very  contracted  dimensions  had  been  con- 
structed for  the  garrison,  to  protect  the  battery,  but  this 
field  Avork  was  commanded  by  the  hills  already  referred  to, 
and  lay  open  to  a  fire  of  artillery  from  every  direction  ex- 
cept from  the  hills  below. 

To  guard  against  the  effects  of  the  fire  of  artillery  from 
these  heights,  a  line  of  defensive  works,  consisting  of  rifle 
pits  and  abattis  for  infantry,  detached  on  our  right,  but  con- 
tinuous on  our  left,  with  defences  for  our  light  artillery, 
were  laid  off  by  Major  Gilmer,  Engineer  of  General  A.  S. 
Johnston's  Staff,  but  on  duty  with  me  at  the  post,  around  the 
rear  of  the  battery  and  on  the  heights,  from  which  artillery 
could  reach  our  battery  and  inner  field  work,  enveloping 
the  inner  work  and  town  of  Dover,  where  our  principal  sup- 
plies of  Commissary  and  Quartermaster  stores  were  in  depot. 
These  works,  pushed  with  the  utmost  possible  energy,  were 
not  quite  completed,  nor  my  troops  all  in  position,  though 
nearly  so,  when  Brigadier-General  Floyd,  my  senior  officer, 
reached  that  station. 

The  works  were  laid  off  with  judgment  and  skill,  by  Major 
Gilmer,  were  well  executed  and  designed  for  the  defence  of  the 
rear  of  work,  the  only  objection  being  to  the  length  of  the 
line,  which,  however,  from  the  surroundings,  was  unavoida- 
ble. The  length  of  the  line,  and  the  inadequacy  of  the  force 
for  its  defence,  were  a  source  of  embarrassment  throughout 
the  struggle  which  subsequently  ensued,  in  the  defence  of 
the  position. 

I  had  placed  Brigadier-General  Buckner  in  command  of 
the  right  wing,  and  Brigadier-General  Johnson  in  command 
of  the  left. 

By  extraordinary  efforts,  we  had  barely  got  these  works 
in  defensible  condition,  when  the  enemy  made  an  advance  in 
force  around  and  against  the  entire  line  of  out-works. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  TRENCHES. 

The  first  assault  was  commenced  by  the  enemy's  artillery, 
against  the  centre  of  our  left  wing,  which  was  promptly  re- 
sponded to  by  Capt.  Green's  battery  of  field  artillery.  Af- 
ter several  hours  of  fire  between  the  artillery  of  the  two 
armies,  the  enemy's  infantry  advanced  to  the  conflict  all 
along  the  line,  which  was  kept  up  and  increased  in  volume, 
from  one  end  of  the  line  to  the  other,  for  several  hours, 
when,  at  last,  the  enemy  made  a  vigorous  assault  against 
the  right  of  our  left  wing,  the  position  assaulted  being  a 
height  commanded  by  Col.  ITeiman,  and  defended  by  his 
brigade,  consisting  of  the  Tenth  (luth)  Tenn< — e,  under 
command  of  Lieut.  Col.  McGarock,  Col.  Voorhies,  Colonel 
Hughes,  and  Col.  Head's  regiments  Tenn 
and  defended  by  Capt.  Maney's  held  battery. 

This  assault  was  vigorously  made,  and  the  position  as 
vigorously  defended,  and  resulted  in  the  repulse  of  the  ene- 
my here  and  everywhere  around  the  line.  The  result  of  the 
day's  work  pretty  well  tested  the  strength  of  our  defensive 
line,  and  established,  beyond  question,  the  gallantry  of  the 
entire  command,  all  of  which  fought  well  their  portion  of 
the  line.  The  loss  sustained  by  our  forces  in  this  engage- 
ment was  not  large,  our  men  being  mostly  und<  r  in 
the  rifle  pits,  but  we,  nevertheless,  Bad  quite  a  number 
killed  and  wounded;  but,  owing  to  the  continued  fighting 
which  followed,  it  was  impossible  to  get  any  official  report  of 
the  casualties  of  the  day.  On  the  same  day.  <  ur  battery  on 
the  river  was  engaged  with  one  of  the  enemy's  gunlx 
which  occasioned  quite  a  lively  cannonading  for  more  than 
an  hour,  in  which  the  gallant  Capt.  Dixon,  of  the  Engineer 
Corps,  was  killed  instantly  at  the  battery.  This  officer  had 
been  on  duty  for  some  months  at  the  post,  and  had  shown 
great  energy  and  professional  skill,  ami  by  his  gallant  bear- 
ing on  that  day.  while  directing  the  operations  under  my 
orders,  had  justly  won  for  himself  high  distinction.  Hi's 
death  was  a  serious  loss  to  the  service,  and  was  a  source  of 
no  little  embarrassment  in  our  after  operations.  On  the 
twelfth  (12th)  we  had  quiet,  but  we  saw  the  smoke  of  a  large 
number  of  gunboats  and  steamboats  a  short  distance  below. 
We  also  received  reliable  information  of  the  arrival  of  a 
large  number  of  new  troops,  greatly  increasing  the  strength 
of  the  enemy's  forces,  already  said  to  be  from  twenty 
thirty  thousand  strong. 


THE  BATTLE  WITH  THE  GUNBOATS. 

On  the  thirteenth  (13)  these  reinforcements  were  seen 
advancing  to  their  position  in  the  line  of  investment,  and 
while  this  was  being  done,  six  of  the  enemy's  iron-cased 
gunboats  were  seen  advancing  up  the  river,  five  of  which 
were  abreast  and  in  line  of  battle,  and  the  sixth  some  dis- 
tance to  the  rear.  When  these  gunboats  arrived  within  a 
mile  and  a  half  of  our  battery,  they  opened  fire  on  the  bat- 
tei'y.  My  orders  to  the  officers,  Captain  Sinister,  and  Capt. 
Standeruitzs,  who  commanded  the  lower  battery  of  eight 
guns,  and  Capt.  Ross,  the  upper  battery  of  four  guns,  were 
to  hold  their  fire,  until  the  enemy's  boats  should  come  within 
point  blank  range  of  their  guns. 

This  they  did,  though  the  ordeal  of  holding  their  fire,  while 
the  enemy's  shot  and  shell  fell  thick  around  their  position, 
was  a  severe  restraint  upon  their  patriotic  impulses,  but, 
nevertheless,  our  batteries  made  no  response  till  the  gun- 
boats got  within  range  of  their  guns.  Our  entire  line  of  bat- 
teries then  opened  fire.  The  guns  of  both  parties  were  well- 
served,  the  enemy  constantly  advancing,  delivering  direct 
fire  against  our  batteries,  from  his  line  of  five  gunboats, 
while  the  sixth  boat,  moving  up  in  the  rear  of  the  line,  kept 
the  air  filled  with  shells,  which  fell  thick  and  close  around 
the  position  of  our  batteries.  The  fight  continued,  the  ene- 
my steadily  advancing  slowly  up  the  river,  the  shot  and  shell 
from  fitteen  heavy  rifle  guns  tearing  our  parapets,  and  plung- 
ing deep  into  the  earth  around  and  over  the  batteries,  for 
nearly  two  hours,  and  until  his  boats  had  reached  within  the 
distance  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  (150)  yards  of  our  batte- 
ries. Having  come  in  such  close  conflict,  I  could  distinctly 
see  the  effect  of  our  shot  upon  his  iron-cased  boats.  We 
had  given  two  or  three  well-directed  shots  from  the  heavy 
guns  to  one  of  his  boats,  when  she  instantly  shrunk  back  and 
drifted  helpless  below  the  line  ;  several  shot  struck  another 
boat,  tearing  her  iron  case  and  splintering  her  timbers,  and 
making  them  crack  as  if  by  a  stroke  of  lightning,  when  she, 
too,  fell  back.  Then  a  third  boat  received  several  severe 
shocks,  making  her  metal  ring  and  her  timbers  crack,  when 
the  whole  line  gave  way  and  fell  rapidly  back  from  our  fire, 
until  they  passed  out  of  range.  Thus  ended  the  first  severe 
and  close  conflict  of  our  heavy  guns  with  the  enemy's  gun- 
boats, testing  their  strength  and  the  power  of  our  heavy 
guns  to  resist  them. 


The  shot  from  our  (32)  thirty-two  pound  guns  produced 
but  little  effect.  They  struck  and  rebounded  apparently  doing 
but  little  damage;  but  I  am  satisfied,  from  close  observation, 
that  the  timbers  of  the  frame-work  did  not  and  could  not  with- 
stand the  shock  of  the  ten  (10)  inch  coJumbiad  or  thirty-two 
pound  (32)  rifle  guns.  These  gunboats  never  renewed  the  at- 
tack. I  learn  from  citizens,  living  on  the  river  below,  that  one 
of  the  injured  boats  sunk,  and  that  others  had  to  be  towed  to 
Cairo.  This  information  may  or  may  not  be  true,  but  it  is  cer- 
tain that  all  of  the  boats  were  repulsed  and  driven  back,  after  a 
most  vigorous  and  determined  attack,  and  that  two  of  the 
boats  were  badly  damaged,  and  that  a  third  was  more  Or  less 
injured.  It  is  difficult  to  over-estimate  the  gallant  bearing 
and  heroic  conduct  of  the  officers  and  men  of  our  batte 
who  so  well  and  so  persistently  fought  our  guns,  until  the 
enemy's  determined  advance  brought  his  boats  and  guns  into 
such  close,  desperate  conflict.  Where  all  did  their  duty  so 
well,  it  is  almost  impossible  to  discriminate.  The  Captains 
already  named  and  their  Lieutenants  (whose  names  for  want 
of  the  official  reports  I  cannot  give)  all  deserve  the  highest 
commendation. 

Lieutenant  George  S.  Martin,  whose  company  is  at  Co- 
lumbus, Kv..  (but  who  was  ordered  to  that  post  by  Major- 
General  Polk)  commanded  one  of  the  guns,  particularly 
tracted  my  attention  by  his  energy  and  the  judgment  with 
which  he  fought  his  gun.  The  wadding  having  given  out, 
he  pulled  off  his  coat  and  rammed  it  down  his  gun,  as  wad- 
ding, and  thus  kept  up  the  fire  until  the  enemy  were  finally 
repulsed.  On  the  evening  of  this  'lay  we  received  infoi 
tion  of  the  arrival  of  additional  reinforcements  of  infantry, 
cavalry  and  light  artillery  by  steamboat,  all  of  which  were 
disembarked  a  short  distance  below  our  position. 

THE    BATTLE  OF    DOVER. 

On  the  fourteenth  (14th)  instant,  the  enemy  was  busy 
throwing  his  forces  of  every  arm  around  us,  extending  his 
line  of  investment  cntirehT  around  our  position  and  com- 
pletely enveloping  us.  On  the  evening  of  this  day  we  as- 
certained that  the  enemy  had  received  by  steamboats  addi- 
tional reinforcements. 

We  were  now  surrounded  by  an  immence  force  said  by 
prisoners  whom  we  had  taken,  to  amount  to  fifty-two  (.52) 
regiments,  and  every  road  and  possible  avenue  of  departure 


10 

cut  off,  with  the  certainty  that  our  sources  of  supply  by  the 
river  would  soon  be  cut  off  by  the  enemy's  batteries,  placed 
upon  the  river  above  us. 

At  a  meeting  of  general  officers,  called  by  Gen.  Floyd,  it 
was  determined  unanimously  to  give  the  enemy  battle  next 
day  at  daylight,  so  as  to  cut  open  a  route  of  exit,  and  thus 
to  save  our  army.  We  had  knowledge  that  the  principal 
portion  of  the  enemy's  forces  were  massed  in  encampment 
in  front  of  the  extreme  left  of  our  position,  commanding 
the  two  roads  in  the  interior,  one  of  which  we  must  take  in 
retiring  from  our  position.  We  knew  he  had  massed  in 
encampment  another  large  force  on  the  Winn's  Ferry  road, 
opposite  the  centre  of  our  left  wing,  while  still  another  was 
massed  nearly  in  front  of  the  left  of  our  right  wing.  His 
fresh  arrival  of  troops  being  encamped  on  the  bank  of  the 
river  two  and  a  half  (2  1-2)  miles  below  us,  from  which 
latter  encampment  a  stream  of  fresh  troops  were  continually 
pouring  around  us  on  his  line  of  investment,  and  strength- 
ening his  general  encampment  on  the  extreme  right.  At 
each  of  his  encampments  and  on  each  road  he  had  in  posi- 
tion a  battery  of  field  artillery,  and  twenty-four  (24)  pound 
iron  guns,  on  siege  carriages.  Between  each  of  these  en- 
campments on  the  roads  was  a  thick  undergrowth  of  brush 
and  black  jack,  making  it  impossible  to  advance  or  manoeu- 
vre any  considerable  body  of  troops. 

The  plan  of  attack  agreed  upon  and  directed  by  General 
Floyd  to  be  executed  was :  that  with  the  main  body  of  the 
forces,  defending  our  left  wing,  I  should  attack  the  right 
wing  of  the  enemy  occupying  and  resting  on  the  heights 
reaching  to  the  bank  of  the  liver,  accompanied  by  Col. 
Forest's  Brigade;  that  Brigadier-General  Buckner,  with 
the  forces  under  his  command,  and  defending  the  right  of 
our  line,  should  strike  the  enemy's  encampment  and  forces 
on  the  Winn's  Ferry  road ;  that  the  forces  under  Col.  Hei- 
man  should  hold  his  position,  and  that  each  command  should 
leave  in  the  trenches  troops  to  hold  the  trenches. 

In  this  order  of  battle  it  was  easy  to  be  seen  that  if  my 
attack  was  successful  and  the  enemy  routed,  that  his  retreat 
would  be  along  his  line  of  investment,  toward  the  Winn's 
Ferry  encampment,  and  thence  towards  his  reserve  at  the 
gunboats  below.  In  other  words,  my  success  would  roll 
the  enemy's  force  in  retreat  over  upon  Gen.  Buckner,  when, 
by  his  attack  in  flank  and  rear,  we  could  cut  up  the  enemy 
and  put  him  completely  to  rout.     Accordingly  dispositions 


11 

"were  made  to  attack  the  enemy  at  five  o'clock.  A.  M.,  of  the 
fifteenth  (loth).  I  moved  out  of  my  position  to  engage  the 
enemy.  The  enemy  was  prepared  to  receive  me  in  ad- 
vance of  his  encampment ;  and  he  did  meet  me  before  I  had 
assumed  a  line  of  battle,  and  while  I  was  moving  against 
him  without  any  formation  for  the  engagement 

For  the  first  half  hour  of  the  engagement  T  was  much 
embarrassed  in  getting  the  command  in  position  properly  to 
engage  the  foe.  Having  extricated  myself  from  the  position 
and  fairly  engaged  the  enemy,  we  fought  him  for  nearly 
two  hours  before  I  made  any  decided  advance  upon  him. 
lie  contested  the  field  most  Btubbornly.  The  Loss  of  both 
armies  on  this  portion  of  the  field  was  heavy.  The  enemy's 
particularly  so,  as  I  discovered  by  riding  over  the  field  after 
the  battle.  The  enemy  having  been  forced  to  yield,  retired 
slowly  toward  the  Winn's  Ferry  road,  Buckner's  point  of 
attack.  He  did  not  retreat,  but  fell  back  fighting  us,  and 
contesting  every  inch   of  ground. 

The  fight  was  hotly  and  Btubbornly  contested  on  both 
sides,  and  consumed  the  day  till  12  o'clock,  to  drive  the 
enemy  as  far  back  as  the  centre,  where  Gen.  Buckner's 
command  was  to  flank  him.  AN  hile  my  command  was  ad* 
vancing  and  slowly  driving  him.  I  was  anxiously  expecting 
to  hear  Gen.  Buckner's  command  open  fire  in  his  rear,  which. 
not  taking  place,  I  was  apprehensive  of  some  misappreh  vi- 
sion of  orders,  and  came  from  the  field  of  battle  within  the 
work  to  learn  what  was  the  matter.  I  there  found  the  com- 
mand of  Gen.  Buckner  massed  behind  the  hill  within  the 
work,  taking  shelter  from  the  enemy's  artillery  on  the 
Winn's  Ferry  road,  it  having  been  forced  to  retire  before 
that  battery,  as  I  learned  from  him.  My  fore:  was  still 
advancing,  driving  tin1  enemy  towards  the  battery.  1  di- 
rected Gen.  Buckner  immediately  to  move  his  command 
round  the  rear  of  the  battery,  turning  its  left,  keeping  in 
the  hollow,  and  attack  and  carry  it. 

Before  the  movement  was  executed,  my  forces,  forming 
the  attacking  party  on  the  right,  with  Colonel  Forest's 
regimen!  of  cavalry,  had  reached  the  position  of  the  bat- 
tery. > 'olonel  Forest's  cavalry  gallantly  charged  a  large 
body  of  infantry  supporting  the  b  ttery.  driving  it  and 
forcing  the  battery  to  retire,  taking  six  piece-  of  artillery, 
four  brass,  and  two  twenty-four  (24)  pound  iron  guns.  In 
pursuing  the  enemy  falling  back  from  this  position.  General 
Buckner's  forces  became  united  with  mine   and  engaged  the 


12 

enemy  in  a  hot  contest,  of  nearly  an  hour,  with  large  forces 
of  fresh  troops,  that  had  now  met  us.  This  position  of  the 
enemy  being  carried  by  our  joint  forces,  I  called  off  farther 
pursuit  after  seven-and-a-half  hours  of  continuous  and 
bloody  conflict.  After  the  troops  were  called  oft*  from  the 
pursuit,  orders  were  immediately  given  to  the  different 
commands  to  form  and  retire  to  their  original  positions  in 
the  trenches. 

The  operations  of  the  day  had  forced  the  entire  command 
of  the  enemy  around  to  our  right  wing,  and  in  front  of 
General  Buckner's  position  in  the  entrenchment,  and  when 
he  reached  his  position,  I  found  the  enemy  rapidly  advanc- 
ing to  take  possession  of  his  portion  of  our  work.  He  had 
a  stubborn  conflict,  lasting  one  hour  and  a  half,  to  regain  his 
position,  and  the  enemy  actually  got  possession  of  the  ex- 
treme right  of  his  position,  and  held  it  so  firmly  that  he 
could  not  dislodge  him.  The  position  thus  gained  by  the 
enemy  was  a  most  important  and  commanding  one,  being 
immediately  in  rear  of  our  river  batteries  and  held  work  for 
its  protection.  From  it  he  could  readily  turn  the  entrench- 
ed work  occupied  by  General  Buckner,  and  attack  him  in 
reverse,  or  he  could  advance,  under  cover  of  an  intervening 
ridge,  directly  upon  our  battery  and  field-work.  While  the 
enemy  held  the  position,  it  was  manifest  Ave  could  not  hold 
the  main  work  or  battery.  Such  was  the  condition  of  the 
two  armies  at  night-fall,  after  nine  hours  of  conflict  on  the 
fifteenth  instant,  in  which  our  loss  was  severe,  and  leaving 
not  less  than  one  thousand  (1,000)  of  the  enemy  dead  upon 
the  field.  We  left  upon  the  field  nearly  all  of  his  wounded, 
because  we  could  not  remove  them.  We  left  his  dead  un- 
buried,  because  we  could  not  bury  them.  Such  conflict  and 
carnage  has,  perhaps,  never  before  occurred  upon  this  con- 
tinent. We  took  about  three  hundred  prisoners  and  a  large 
number  of  arms. 

We  had  fought  this  battle  to  open  the  way  for  our  army 
and  relieve  us  from  an  investment  which  would  necessarily 
reduce  us,  and  the  position  we  occupied,  by  famine. 

We  had  accomplished  our  object,  but  it  occupied  the  Avhole 
day,  and  before  we  could  prepare  to  leave,  after  taking  in 
the  wounded  and  dead,  the  enemy  had  thrown  around  us 
again,  in  the  night,  an  immense  force  of  fresh  troops,  and 
re-occupied  his  original  position  in  the  line  of  investment, 
thus  again  cutting  off  our  retreat.  We  had  only  about 
thirteen  (13,000)  thousand  troops,  all  told.     Of  these  we 


13 

had  lost  in  three  battles  a  large  proportion.  The  command 
had  been  in  the  trenches  night  and  day  for  five  days  exposed 
to  the  snow,  sleet,  mud  and  ice  water,  without  shelter  and 
without  adequate  covering,  and  without  sleep. 

In  this  condition  the  general  officers  held  a  consultation 
to  determine  what  we  sin  Mild  do.  General  Buckner  gave  it 
as  his  decided  opinion  that  he  could  not  hold  his  position 
half  an  hour  against  an  assault  of  the  enemy,  and  said  he 
was  satisfied  that  the  enemy  would  attack  him  next  morning 
at  day-light.  The  proposition  was  then  made  by  the  un- 
dersigned to  again  fight  our  way  through  the  enemy's  line, 
and  cut  our  way  out.  General  Buckner  said  his  command 
was  so  worn  out  and  cut  to  pieces,  and  demoralized,  that  he 
could  not  make  another  fight  ;  that  it  would  cost  the  com- 
mand three-fourths  its  present  numbers  to  cut  its  way  out, 
and  it  was  wrong  to  sacrifice  three-fourths  to  save  one- 
fourth  ;   that  no  officer  had  a  right  to  cause  such  a   sacrifice. 

General  Floyd  and  Major  Gilmer  I  understood  to  concur 
in  this  opinion. 

I  then  expressed  the  opinion  that  we  could  hold  out 
another  day,  and  in  that  time  we  could  get  BteamboatS  and 
set  the  command  over  the  river,  and  probably  save  a  large 
portion  of  it.  To  this  General  Buckner  replied,  "that  the 
enemy  would  certainly  attack  him  in  the  morning,  and  that 
he  could  not  hold  his  position  half  an  hour."  The  alterna- 
tive of  these  propositions  was  a  surrender  of  the  position 
and  command.  General  Floyd  said  he  would  not  surrender 
the  command,  nor  would  he  surrender  himself  a  prisoner.  I 
had  taken  the  same  position.  General  Buckner  said  he  was 
satisfied  nothing  else  could  he  done,  and  that,  therefore,  he 
would  surrender  the  command,  if  placed  in  command.  Gen- 
eral Floyd  said  he  would  turn  over  the  command  to  him,  if 
he  could  be  allowed  to  withdraw  his  command.  To  this 
General  Buckner  consented.  Thereupon  the  command  was 
turned  over  to  me,  I  passing  it  instantly  to  General  Buck- 
ner, saying :  "  I  would  neither  surrender  the  command  nor 
myself."  I  directed  Colonel  Forest  to  cut  his  way  out. 
Under  these  circumstances  General  Buckner  accepted  the 
command,  and  sent  a  flag  of  truce  to  the  enemy  for  an 
armistice  of  six  hours  to  negotiate  for  terms  of  capitulation. 
Before  this  flag  and  communication  was  delivered,  I  retired 
from  the  garrison. 

Before  closing  my  report  of  the  operations  of  the  army  at 
Donelson,  I  must,  in  justice  to  the  officers  and  command 


14 

under  my  immediate  command,  say  that  harder  fighting  or 
more  gallant  conduct  in  officers  and  men  I  have  never  wit- 
nessed. In  the  absence  of  official  reports  of  brigade  and 
regimental  commands,  (of  •which  I  am  deprived  by  the  cir- 
cumstances detailed  in  this  report,)  I  may  not  be  able  to  do 
justice  to  the  different  corps.  I  will  say,  however,  that  the 
forces  under  my  immediate  command  during  this  action  bore 
themselves  most  gallantly  throughout  the  long  and  bloody 
conflict. 

I  speak  with  especial  commendation  of  the  brigades  com- 
manded by  Colonels  Baldwin,  AVharton,  McCausland,  Simon- 
ton  and  Drake,  and  of  Captains  Maney  and  Green,  who 
fought  their  guns  under  the  constant  and  annoying  fire  of 
the  enemy's  sharp-shooters,  and  of  the  concentrated  fire 
from  his  field  batteries,  from  which  both  commands  suffered 
severely. 

Captain  Maney  was  himself  wounded,  and  had  several 
lieutenants  killed  and  many  of  his  company  killed  and 
wounded;  so  did  Captains  Porter  and  Graves.  If  I  should 
hereafter  receive  the  reports  of  regimental  and  brigade  com- 
mands, giving  me  detailed  information  of  the  conduct  and 
bearing  of  officers  and  men,  I  will  make  a  supplemental  re- 
port. 

The  absence  of  official  reports  deprives  me  of  the  means 
of  giving  lists  ot  the  killed  and  wounded  of  the  different 
commands. 

I  am  satisfied  that  in  such  a  series  of  conflicts  our  loss 
was  heavy.  I  know  the  enemy's  was,  from  passing  over  the 
battle-field  in  the  evening  immediately  after  the  battle  with 
General  Floyd.  His  loss  in  killed  and  wrounded  was  terri- 
ble, exceeding  anything  I  have  ever  seen  upon  a  battle-field. 
Our  total  force  on  the  field  did  not  exceed  ten  (10,000)  thou- 
sand men,  while,  from  what  I  saw  of  the  enemy's  force,  and 
from  information  derived  from  many  prisoners  of  the  enemy, 
we  are  sure  he  had  thirty  or  forty  thousand  (30  or  40,000) 
-on  the  field.  I  must  acknowledge  my  obligations  to  Major 
Gilmer,  Engineer,  for  the  special  and  valuable  services  ren- 
dered me  in  laying  off  these  works,  and  the  energy  displayed 
by  him  in  directing  their  construction,  and  for  his  counsel 
and  advice.  I  likewise  acknowledge  my  obligations  to  Cap- 
tain Gustavus  A.  Heing,  my  Assistant  Adjutant  General,  to 
Colonel  John  C.  Burch,  my  Aid-de-Camp,  to  Major  Field, 
to  Lieutenant  Nicholson,  to  Lieutenant  Charles  F.  Martin 
•and  Colonel  Brandon,  my  volunteer  Aids-de-Camp ;  to  Major 


15 

Hays,  my  Assistant  Commissary,  and  Major  Jones,  my  As- 
sistant Quartermaster,  for  the  prompt  manner  in  which  they 
executed  my  orders,  under  trying  circumstances,  throughout 
the  long  and  continued  conflicts,  and  to  Major  Gilmer,  who 
accompanied  me  to  the  field  and  was  with  me  throughout  the 
entire  day.  Also  to  Captain  Parker,  of  my  staff,  whom  I 
assigned  to  command  of  Captain  Boss's  field  battery,  with 
neAV  recruits  as  gunners,  after  Captain  Maney's  battery  was 
disabled,  and  who  fought  and  served  them  well.  The  con- 
duct of  these  officers,  coming  under  my  immediate  attention 
and  observation,  met  my  hearty  approval  and  commenda- 
tion. Colonel  Brandon  was  severely  wounded  early  in  the 
action.  Colonel  Baldwin's  Brigade  constituted  the  front  of 
the  attacking  force,  sustained  immediately  by  Colonel  Whar- 
ton's Brigade.  These  two  Brigades  deserve  especial  com- 
mendation for  the  manner  in  which  they  sustained  the  firsl 
shock  of  battle,  ami.  under  circumstances  of  great  embar- 
rassment, threw  themselves  into  position  and  followed  up 
the  conflict  throughout  the  day. 

Being  mostly  with  these  two  brigades,  I  can  speak  from 
personal  knowledge  of  the  gallant  hearing  of  their  com- 
manders. I  must  also  acknowledge  my  obligations  to  Brig- 
adier-General Johnson,  who  assisted  me  in  the  command  of 
the  forces  with  which  I  attacked  the  enemy,  and  who  fore 
himself  gallantly  throughout  the  conflict;  but  having  re- 
ceived no  official  report  from  him,  I  cannot  give  the  de- 
tailed operations  of  his  command. 

I  have  pleasure  in  being  able  to  say  that  Col.  Forrest, 
whose  command  greatly  distinguished  its  commander  as  a 
hold  and  judicious  commander,  and  reflected  distinguished 
honor  upon  itself,  passed  safely  through  the  enemy's  line  of 
investment,  and  trust  it  will  yet  win  other  honors  in  de» 
fence  of  our  rights  and  just  cause  of  country. 

(Signed)  GID.  J.  PILLOW, 

Brigadier-General  C.  S.  A. 

Official :  Jno.  Withers, 

A.  A.  General. 

A.  &  I.  G.  0.,  March  10,  1862. 


REPORT    OF    JOHN    B.  FLOYD, 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  OF  THE  C.  S.  A. 


Camp  near  Murfreesboro', 
February  27th,  1862. 
Gen.  A.  S.  Johnston  : 

Sir:  Your  order  of  the  12th  of  this  month,  transmitted 
to  me  from  Bowling  Green,  by  telegraph  to  Cumberland 
city,  reached  me  the  same  evening.  It  directed  me  to  re- 
pair at  once,  with  what  force  I  could  command,  to  the  sup- 
port of  the  garrison  at  "  Fort  Donclson."  I  immedialih 
prepared  for  my  departure,  and  effected  it  in  time  to  reach 
"Fort  Donelson,"  the  next  morning,  13th,  before  day- 
light. Measures  had  been  already  taken  by  Brigadier-Gene- 
ral Pillow,  then  in  command,  to  render  our  resistance  to 
the  attack  of  the  enemy  as  effective  as  possible.  He  had 
with  activity  and  industry  pushed  forward  the  defensive 
works  towards  completion.  These  defences  consisted  in  an 
earthwork  in  "  Fort  Donelson,"  in  which  were  mounted 
guns  of  different  calibres,  to  the  number  of  thirteen.  A 
field  work  intended  for  the  infantry  supports,  and  con- 
structed immediately  behind  the  battery,  and  upon  the 
the  summit  of  the  hill  in  rear.  Sweeping  away  from  this 
field  work  eastward,  to  the  extent  of  nearly  two  miles  in  its 
windings,  was  a  line  of  entrenchments  defended  on  the  out- 
side at  some  points  with  abattis.  These  entrenchments 
were  occupied  by  the  troops  already  there,  and  by  the  addi- 
tion of  those  which  came  upon  the  field  with  me.  The  po- 
sition of  the  Fort,  which  was  established  by  the  Tennessee 
authorities,  was  by  no  means  commanding,  nor  was  the 
least  military  significance  attached  to  the  position.  The 
entrenchments,  afterwards  hastily  made  in  many  places, 
were  injudiciously  constructed  because  of  the  distance  they 
were  placed  from  the  brow  of  the  hill,  subjecting  the  men 
to  a  heavy  fire  from  the  enemy's  sharp  shooters  opposite,  as 
they  advanced  to  or  retired  from  the  entrenchments.  Soon 
2 


18 

after  my  arrival  the  entrenchments  were  fully  occupied 
from  one  end  to  the  other,  and  just  as  the  sun  rose  the 
cannonade  from  one  of  the  enemy's  gunboats  announced  the 
opening  of  the  conflict,  which  was  destined  to  continue  for 
three  days  and  nights.  In  a  very  short  time  the  fire  be- 
came general  along  our  whole  lines,  and  the  enemy,  who 
had  already  planted  batteries  at  several  points  around  the 
whole  circuit  of  our  entrenchments,  as  shown  by  a  diagram 
herewith  sent,  opened  a  general  and  active  fire  from  all 
arms  upon  our  trenches,  which  continued  until  darkness 
put  an  end  to  the  conflict.  They  charged  with  uncommon 
spirit  at  several  points  along  on  the  line,  but  most'  particu- 
larly at  a  point  undefended  by  entrenchments,  down  it  hol- 
low, which  separated  the  right  wing,  under  the  command  of 
Brigadier- General  Buckner,  from  the  right  of  the  centre 
commanded  by  Col.  Heiman.  This  charge  was  prosecuted 
with  uncommon  vigor,  but  was  met  with  a  determined  spirit 
of  resistance,  a  cool,  deliberate  courage  both  by  the  troops 
of  Brigadier-General  Buckner  and  Col.  Heiman,  which  drove 
the  enemy,  discomfited  and  cut  to  pieces,  back  upon  the  posi- 
tion he  had  assumed  in  the  morning.  Too  high  praise  can- 
not be  bestowed  upon  the  battery  of  Captain  Porter,  for 
their  participation  in  the  rout  of  the  enemy  in  this  assault. 
My  position  was  immediately  in  front  of  the  point  of  attack, 
and  I  was  thus  enabled  to  witness  more  distinctly  the  inci- 
dents of  it. 

The  enemy  continued  their  fire  upon  different  parts  of 
our  entrenchments  throughout  the  night,  which  deprived  our 
men  of  any  opportunity  to  sleep.  We  lay  that  night  upon 
our  arms,  in  the  trenches.  We  confidently  expected,  at  the 
dawn  of  day,  a  more  vigorous  attack  than  ever ;  but  in  this 
we  were  entirely  mistaken.  The  day  advanced,  and  no  pre- 
parations seemed  to  be  making  for  a  general  onset ;  but  an 
extremely  annoying  fire  was  kept  up  from  the  enemy's 
sharp-shooters,  throughout  the  whole  length  of  the  entrench- 
ments, from  their  long-range  rifles.  Whilst  this  mode  of 
attack  Avas  not  attended  with  any  considerable  loss,  it,  never- 
theless, confined  the  men  to  their  trenches,  and  prevented 
their  taking  their  usual  rest. 

So  stood  the  affairs  of  the  field  until  about  three  o'clock 
P.  M.,  when  the  fleet  of  gunboats,  in  full  force,  advanced 
upon  the  Fort  and  opened  fire.  They  advanced  in  the  shape 
of  a  crescent,  and  kept  up  a  constant  and  incessant  fire  for 
one  hour  and  a  half,  which  was  replied  to  with  uncommon 


19 

spirit  and  vigor  by  the  Fort.  Once  the  boats  reached  a 
point  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  the  Fort,  at  which  time 
it  was  that  three  of  their  boats  sustained  serious  injuries 
from  our  batteries,  and  were  compelled  to  fall  buck.  The 
line  was  broken,  and  the  enemy  discomfited  on  the  water, 
giving  up  the  fight  entirely,  which  he  never  afterwards  re- 
newed. I  was  satisfied,  from  the  incidents  of  the  last  two 
days,  that  the  enemy  did  not  intend  again  to  give  us  battle 
in  our  trenches.  They  had  been  fairly  repulsed,  with  very 
heavy  slaughter,  upon  every  effort  to  storm  our  position; 
and  it  was  but  fair  to  infer  that  they  would  not  again  renew 
the  unavailing  attempt  at  our  dislodgment,  when  certain 
means  to  effect  the  same  end,  without  loss,  were  perfectly  at 
their  command.  We  were  aware  of  the  fact  that  extremely 
heavy  reinforcements  had  been  continually  arriving,  day 
and  night,  for  three  days  and  nights;  and  I  had  no  doubt, 
whatever,  that  their  whole  available  force  on  the  western 
waters  could,  and  would,  be  concentrated  here,  if  it  was 
deemed  necessary  to  reduce  our  position.  I  hail  already 
seen  the  impossibility  of  holding  out,  for  any  length  of  time, 
with  our  inadequate  number  and  indefensible  position. 
There  was  no  place  within  our  entrenchments  but  could  be 
reached  by  the  enemy's  artillery,  from  their  boats  or  their 
batteries.  It  was  but  fair  to  infer  that,  whilst  they  kept  up 
a  sufficient  fire  upon  our  entrenchments  to  keep  our  men 
from  sleep  and  prevent  repose,  their  object  was  merely  to 
give  time  to  pass  a  column  above  us  on  the  river,  both  on 
the  right  and  the  left  banks,  and  thus  to  cut  off  all  our  com- 
munications and  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  egress.  I  thus 
saw  clearly  that  but  one  course  was  left  by  which  a  rational 
hope  could  be  cnterfWined  of  saving  the  garrison,  or  a  part 
of  it.  That  was,  to  dislodge  the  enemy  from  his  position  on 
our  left,  and  thus  to  pass  our  people  into  the  open  country 
lying  southward,  towards  Nashville.  I  called  for  a  consul- 
tation of  the  officers  of  Divisions  and  Brigades,  to  take  place 
after  dark,  when  this  plan  was  laid  before  them,  approved 
and  adopted,  and  at  which  it  was  determined  to  move  from 
the  trenches  at  an  early  hour  on  the  next  morning,  and  at- 
tack the  enemy  in  his  position.  It  was  agreed  that  the  at- 
tack should  commence  upon  our  extreme  left,  and  this  duty 
was  assigned  Brigadier-General  Pillow,  assisted  by  Briga- 
dier-General Johnson,  having  also  under  his  command,  com- 
manders of  brigades,  Col.  Baldwin,  commanding  Mississippi 
and  Tennessee  troops,  and  Col.  Wharton  and  Col.   McCaus- 


20 

land,  commanding  Virginians.  To  Brigadier-General  Buck- 
ner  was  assigned  the  duty  of  making  tho  attack,  from  near 
the  centre  of  our  lines,  upon  the  enemy's  forces  upon  the 
Winn's  Ferry  road.  The  attack  on  the  left  was  delayed 
longer  than  I  expected,  and,  consequently,  the  enemy 
was  found  in  position  when  our  troops  advanced.  The  at- 
tack, however,  on  our  part,  was  extremely  spirited,  and  al- 
though the  resistance  of  the  enemy  was  obstinate,  and  their 
numbers  far  exceeded  ours,  our  people  succeeded  in  driving 
them,  discomfited  and  terribly  cut  to  pieces,  from  the  entire 
left.  The  Kentucky  troops,  under  Brigadier-General  Buck- 
ner,  advanced  from  their  position  behind  the  entrenchments, 
upon  the  Winn's  Ferry  road,  but  not  until  the  enemy  had 
been  driven,  in  a  great  measure,  from  the  position  he  occu- 
pied in  the  morning. 

I  had  ordered  on  the  night  before  for  the  two  regiments 
stationed  in  Fort  Donelson  to  occupy  the  trenches  vacated 
by  Brigadier-General  Buckner's  forces,  which,  together 
with  the  men  whom  he  detached  to  assist  in  this  purpose,  I 
thought  sufficient  to  hold  them.  My  intention  was  to  hold, 
with  Brigadier-General  Buckner's  command,  the  Winn's 
Ferry  Road,  and  thus  to  prevent  the  enemy,  during  the 
night,  from  occupying  the  position  on  our  left  which  he 
occupied  in  the  morning.  I  gave  him  orders  upon  the  field 
to  that  effect.  Leaving  him  in  position  then,  I  started  for 
the  right  of  our  command  to  see  that  all  was  secure  there ; 
my  intention  being,  if  things  could  be  held  in  the  condition 
they  then  were,  to  move  the  whole  army,  if  posible,  to  the 
open  country  lying  southward  beyond  the  Randolph  Forges. 
During  my  absence,  and  from  some  misapprehension,  I  pre- 
sume, of  the  previous  order  given,  Brrgadier-General  Pil- 
low ordered  Brigadier-General  Buckner  to  leave  his  position 
on  the  Winn's  Ferry  Road  and  to  resume  his  place  in  his 
trenches  on  the  right.  This  movement  was  nearly  executed 
before  I  was  aAvare  of  it.  As  the  enemy  was  pressing  upon 
the  trenches,  I  deemed  that  the  execution  of  this  last  order 
was  all  that  was  left  to  be  done.  The  enemy  in  part  suc- 
ceeded in  occupying  an  angle  of  the  trenches  on  the  extreme 
right  of  Brigadier-General  Buckner's  command,  and  as  the 
fresh  forces  of  the  enemy  had  begun  already  to  move  towards 
our  left  to  occupy  the  position  they  held  in  the  morning,  and 
as  we  had  no  force  adequate  to  oppose  their  progress,  we 
had  to  submit  to  the  mortification  of  seeing  the  ground 
"which  we  had  won  by  such  a  severe  conflict  in  the  morning 


21 

re-occupied  by  the  enemy  before  midnight.  The  enemy  had 
been  landing  reinforcements  throughout  the  day.  His  num- 
bers had  been  augmented  to  83  regiments.  Our  troops  were 
completely  exhausted  by  four  days  and  nights  of  continued 
conflict.  To  renew  it  with  any  hope  of  successful  result 
was  obviously  vain,  and  such  I  understood  to  be  the  unani- 
mous opinion  of  all  the  officers  present  at  the  council  called 
to  consider  what  was  best  to  lie  done.  I  thought,  and  so 
announced,  tbat  a  desperate  onset  upon  the  right  of  the 
enemy's  forces  on  the  ground,  where  we  had  attacked  theni  in 
the  morning,  might  result  in  the  extricating  of  a  considera- 
ble proportion  of  tiie  command  from  the  position  we  were  in, 
and  this  opinion  1  understood  to  be  concurred  in  by  all  who 
were  present.  But  it  was  likewise  agreed,  with  the  same  unani- 
mity, that  it  would  result  in  the  slaughter  of  nearly  all  who 
did  not  succeed  in  effecting  their  escape.  The  question  then 
arose,  whether  in  point  of  humanity,  and  a  sound  military 
policy,  a  course  should  lie  adopted  from  which  the  probabili- 
ties were  that  the  larger  proportion  of  the  command  would 
be  cut  to  pieces  in  an  unavailing  fight  against  overwhelming 
numbers.  I  understood  the  general  sentiment  to  be  adverse 
to  the  proposition.  I  felt  that  in  this  contingency,  whilst 
it  might  be  questioned  whether  I  should,  as  commander  of 
the  army,  lead  it  to  certain  destruction  in  an  unavailing 
fight,  yet  I  had  a  right  individually  to  determine  that  I 
would  not  survive  a  surrender  there.  To  ratify  both  propo- 
sitions, I  agreed  to  hand  over  the  command  to  Brigadier- 
General  Buckner  through  Brigadier- General  Pillow,  and  to 
make  an  effort  for  my  own  extrication  by  any  and  every 
means  that  might  present  themselves  to  me. 

I  therefore  directed  Col.  Forest,  a  daring  and  determined 
officer,  at  the  head  of  an  efficient  regiment  of  cavalry,  to  be 
present,  for  the  purpose  of  accompanying  me  in  what  I  sup- 
posed would  be  an  effort  to  pass  through  the  enemy's  line. 
I  announced  the  fact  upon  turning  the  command  over  to 
Brigadier-General  Buckner,  that  I  would  bring  away  with 
me,  by  any  means  I  could  command,  my  own  particular  bri- 
gade, the  propriety  of  which  was  acquiesced  in  on  all  hands. 
This,  by  various  modes,  I  succeeded  in  accomplishing  to  a 
great  extent,  and  would  have  brought  off  my  whole  command, 
in  oneway  or  another,  if  I  had  had  the  assistance  of  the  field 
officers,  who  were  absent  from  several  of  the  regiments. 
The  command  was  turned  over  to  Brigadier-General  Buck- 
ner, who  at  once  opened  negotiations  with  the  enemy,  which 


22 

resulted  in  the  surrender  of  the  place.  Thus  ended  the 
conflict  running  through  four  days  and  four  nights;  a  large 
portion  of  which  time  it  was  maintained  with  the  greatest 
fierceness  and  obstinacy ;  in  which  we,  with  a  force  not  ex- 
ceeding 13,000,  a  large  portion  of  whom  were  illy  armed, 
succeeded  in  resisting  and  driving  back,  with  discomfiture, 
an  army  consisting  of  more  than  50,000  men.  I  have  no 
means  of  accurately  estimating  the  loss  of  the  enemy.  From 
what  I  saw  upon  the  battle  field,  from  what  I  witnessed 
throughout  the  whole  period  of  the  conflict,  from  what  I  was 
able  to  learn  from  sources  of  information  deemed  by  me  wor- 
thy of  credit,  I  have  no  doubt  that  the  enemy's  loss  in  killed 
and  wounded  reached  a  number  beyond  (5,000)  five  thousand. 
Our  own  losses  were  extremely  heavy  ;  but  for  want  of  exact 
returns  I  am  unable  to  state  precise  numbers.  I  think  they 
will  not  be  far  from  1500  killed  and  wounded.  Nothing 
could  exceed  the  coolness  and  determined  spirit  of  resistance, 
which  animated  the  men  in  this  long  and  perilous  conflict, 
nothing  could  exceed  the  determined  courage  which  charac- 
terized  them  throughout  this  terrible  struggle,  and  nothing 
could  be  more  admirable  than  the  steadiness  which  they  ex- 
hibited until  nature  itself  was  exhausted,  in  what  they  knew 
to  be  a  desperate  fight  against  a  foe  very  many  times  their 
superior  in  numbers.  I  cannot  particularize  in  this  report 
to  you  the  numberless  instances  of  heroic  daring,  per- 
formed by  both  officers  and  men,  but  must  content  myself 
for  the  present,  by  saying,  in  my  judgment  they  all  desorvo 
well  of  the  country. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be, 

Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

(Signed)  ,  JOHN  B.  FLOYD, 

Brig.  Gen.  Commamlvg. 

(Official)  John  Witiiep.s, 

A.  A.  GemnriiL 

A.  &I.  G.  O.,  March  10,  1862. 


REPORT    OF    G.    C.    WHARTON, 

COLONEL    COMMANDING    FIRST    BRIGADE. 


Headquarters  First  Brigade,  Floyd's  Division, 
Camp  near  Murfrcosboro',  Term.,  Feb.  22,  1862. 
Brigadier -General  John  B.  Floyd: 

Sir  :  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  report  of 
the  participation  of  this  brigade  in  the  engagement  at  Fort 
Donelson. 

The  advance  of  the  brigade,  the  fifty-first  Regiment  Vir- 
ginia volunteers,  readied  Dover,  one  mile  from  the  Fort, 
about  11,  P.  M.,  on  Friday,  the  7th.  and  immediately  re- 
ported to  Brigadier-General  B.  R.  Johnson,  who  was  then 
in  command,  and  was  ordered  to  encamp  near  the  wharf. 
About  4,  P.  M.,  on  the  8th,  the  fifty-sixth  Regiment  Vir- 
ginia volunteers  arrived,  and  was  ordered  to  encamp  near 
the  fifty-first.  From  Saturday  to  Wednesday  following 
there  was  skirmishing  between  our  cavalry  pickets  and  the 
enemy.  On  Wednesday  our  pickets  were  driven  in,  and 
the  enemy  reported  advancing  in  force.  The  brigade  was 
then  ordered  to  take  position  on  the  left  of  Brigadier-Gene- 
ral Buckner's  division,  and  near  the  centre  of  our  line  of 
defence.  Soon  after  taking  position  the  enemy  commenced 
to  throw  shot  and  shell,  which  did  no  execution.  Captain 
Porter's  battery  was  then  ordered  to  take  the  position  which 
had  been  assigned  to  this  brigade,  and  we  were  ordered  to 
the  support  of  the  left  wing,  commanded  by  Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Johnson.  We  were  engaged  during  the  evening  and 
night  in  constructing  breastworks  and  rifle  pits.  During 
Thursday  we  were  under  a  heavy  fire  from  the  enemy's 
batteries ;  there  were  also  frequent  engagements  with  the 
infantry,  in  all  of  which  the  enemy  were  repulsed.  Thurs- 
day night  we  remained  again  in  the  ditches.  On  Friday 
there  was  skirmishing  with  the  infantry  and  sharp  shooters. 
Occasionally  sharp  firing  from  the  batteries.  On  Friday 
evening  occurred  the  terrific  cannonading  between  the  gun- 
boats and  the  Fort,  some  of  the  shells  from  the  boats  ex- 
ploding in  and  near  our  lines,  but  did  no  injury.  On  Satur- 
day morning,  at  four,  A.  M.,  the  brigade  was  withdrawn 
from  the  ditches  and  placed  in  line,  by  order  of  Brigadier- 
General  Pillow,  to  make  an  attack  on  the  enemy's  extreme 


24 

right  flank.  Col.  Baldwin's  Brigade  was  placed  in  advance. 
This  brigade  followed  next.  About  six  o'clock  the  column 
was  put  in  motion.  We  had  scarcely  passed  beyond  the 
line  of  our  defence,  when  the  skirmishers  of  Col.  Baldwin's 
Brigade  engaged  the  enemy's  pickets ;  in  a  few  minutes  the 
engagement  became  general.  We  were  then  ordered  to  de- 
ploy and  advance,  which  was  done  with  spirit  and  prompt- 
ness. The  enemy,  after  a  very  obstinate  resistance,  was 
forced  to  retire,  but  were  either  rallied  or  reinforced  on  the 
several  ridges,  from  which  they  were  again  and  again  driven. 
Our  men,  cheering  as  they  charged,  pursued  them  nearly 
tAvo  miles,  when  orders  were  received  that  we  should  retire 
to  our  entrenchments.  The  brigade  was  very  much  ex- 
hausted, having  been  under  fire  or  in  the  ditches  for  more 
than  four  days.  The  loss  of  the  51st  was  nine  killed,  forty- 
three  wTounded,  and  five  missing;  of  the  56th  eight  were 
killed,  thirty-seven  wounded,  and  one  hundred  and  fifteen 
missing.  Lieut.  Col.  J.  W.  Massie  commanded  the  5ist 
regiment;  his  bearing  was  most  chivalric  and  gallant.  Capt. 
G.  W.  Davis  gallantly  led  the  56th  regiment.  Lieut.  Au- 
gust Forsberg,  attached  to  the  brigade  as  engineer  officer, 
rendered  very  efficient  service  in  rallying  and  leading  the 
men,  and  throughout  the  day  distinguished  himself  for  gal- 
lantry and  acts  of  daring.  To  mention  the  many  individual 
instances  of  heroism  and  daring,  would  too  much  lengthen 
this  report,  therefore,  suffice  it  to  say,  that  all  the  officers 
and  men  of  both  regiments  behaved  with  commendable  cool- 
ness and  bravery. 

Capt.  S.  H.  Newberry,  Lieuts.  Henderson  and  Painter, 
of  the  51st,  were  wounded;  Capt.  D.  C.  Harrison,  of  the 
56th,  was  mortally  wounded  whilst  leading  his  men  to  a 
charge.  Lieuts.  Ferguson  and  Haskins  were  also  wounded. 
A  number  of  improved  arms  were  captured  and  brought  to 
camp. 

On  Sunday  morning  the  1 6th,  the  brigade  was  ordered  from 
Fort  Donelson  to  Nashville,  where  valuable  service  was  ren- 
dered in  guarding  and  shipping  government  stores.  Thurs- 
day, the  20th,  the  brigade  was  ordered  to  this  place,  where 
we  are  now  in  camp. 

Respectfully  submitted, 

(Signed.)  G.  C.  WHARTON, 

Colonel  Cornmanding  Brigade. 

Official :  John  Withers, 

A.  A.  General. 

A.  &  I.  G,  0.,  March  8,  1862. 


REPORT    OF    JOHN     McCAtTSLAND, 

COMMANDING    THE    SECOND    BRIGADE. 


Headquarters  2d  Brigade,  Floyd's  Division.  ) 
Murfreesboro',  Tenn.,  Feb.  23,  1862.      J 

Brigadier-General  John  B.  Floyd  : 

Sir:  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  report  of 
the  action  of  this  brigade  on  the  13th,  14th  and  15th  of  Feb- 
ruary, 1862,  in  the  engagement  near  Fort  Donelson,  be- 
tween the  C.  S.  forces,  and  the  U.  S.  forces,  under  General 
Grant : 

On  the  morning  of  the  13th,  I  received  your  orders  to 
proceed  at  once  from  Cumberland  city  to  Fort  Donelson, 
where  we  arrived  at  daylight,  and  were  at  once  ordered  to 
the  trenches.  This  brigade  was  posted  as  a  support  to 
Green's  battery  on  the  left  wing.  During  the  entire  day 
the  enemy  kept  up  an  incessant  fire  of  shot  and  shell  upon 
the  battery  and  its  support.  The  men  and  officers  behaved 
well  under  the  circumstances,  and  soon  became  accustomed 
to  the  firing.  There  were  five  men  wounded  during  the 
day.  On  the  14th  there  was  continued  skirmishing  with 
artillery  and  musketry.  About  2  o'clock,  P.  M.,  the  gun- 
boats commenced  a  heavy  bombardment  of  the  Fort,  the 
shells  passing  over  and  taking  the  line  of  works  in  reverse, 
and  many  passing  over  and  through  this  brigade  ;  however, 
we  suffered  no  loss,  and  gathered  several  large  shells  (64's 
I  think).  About  dark  another  battery  was  posted  in  front  of 
our  position,  and  during  the  night  it  was  placed  behind  a 
good  earthwork,  thrown  up  by  the  men.  About  midnight  I 
received  orders  to  concentrate  my  brigade  near  the  left 
wing,  which  was  done  promptly  ;  and  at  daylight  of  the 
morning  of  the  loth,  the  column  under  Gen.  Pillow  sallied 
from  the  left,  and  engaged  the  enemy  in  a  short  space  of 
time. 

This  brigade  was  a  reserve  for  Col.  Baldwin's  Brigade, 
but  the  enemy  pressing  his  right,  I  at  once  moved  up  to  his 


26 

support,  and  engaged  the  enemy,  posted  in  thick  under- 
growth and  a  rough  and  rolling  country.  I  ordered  the 
firing  to  commence  as  soon  as  the  enemy  was  in  sight ; 
they  were  advancing  just  in  front  of  the  36th  Virginia 
Regiment.  They,  in  a  short  time,  were  checked,  and  then  I 
ordered  a  charge  upon  them.  The  men  came  up  with  a  shout 
and  charged  the  enemy,  routed  him  and  pursued  him  for 
two  miles,  when  we  were  called  back  by  orders  of  General 
Pillow. 

The  36th  Virginia  Regiment  had  14  killed  and  46  wound- 
ed, the  50th  Virginia  Regiment  had  10  killed  and  40  wound- 
ed. On  Sunday  morning  this  brigade  was  forced  across  the 
river,  and  are  now  arriving  at  this  camp.  Lieut.  Col.  Reid 
was  wounded  about  the  close  of  the  action ;  he  and  Major 
Smith  behaved  gallantly  during  the  day.  In  fact  men  and 
officers  all  behaved  well.  We  captured  one  field  gun  and 
two  hundred  Enfield  muskets. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

(Signed.)  JOHN  McCAUSLAND, 

Commanding  Second  Brigade. 

Official :  John  Withers, 

A.  A.  General. 

A.  &  I.  G.  0.,  March  8.  1S62. 


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